Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Paret...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Western Agricultural Economics Association
1998-07-01
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| Series: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183 |
| Summary: | Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause. |
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| ISSN: | 1068-5502 2327-8285 |