Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range

Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Paret...

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Main Authors: Terence J. Centner, Ronald C. Griffin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Agricultural Economics Association 1998-07-01
Series:Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183
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spelling doaj-bf095d71b2c84f8eb6052b142603fdc42020-11-25T02:56:54ZengWestern Agricultural Economics AssociationJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics1068-55022327-82851998-07-01231718410.22004/ag.econ.3118331183Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open RangeTerence J. CentnerRonald C. GriffinFence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183due processfence lawopen rangepotential pareto criteria
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Terence J. Centner
Ronald C. Griffin
spellingShingle Terence J. Centner
Ronald C. Griffin
Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
due process
fence law
open range
potential pareto criteria
author_facet Terence J. Centner
Ronald C. Griffin
author_sort Terence J. Centner
title Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
title_short Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
title_full Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
title_fullStr Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
title_full_unstemmed Externalities from Roaming Livestock: Explaining the Demise of the Open Range
title_sort externalities from roaming livestock: explaining the demise of the open range
publisher Western Agricultural Economics Association
series Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
issn 1068-5502
2327-8285
publishDate 1998-07-01
description Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.
topic due process
fence law
open range
potential pareto criteria
url https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183
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