Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare

This analysis begins with a definition and discussion of productive advertising. Then, following Dixit and Norman, persuasive advertising is used to study the welfare effects of generic advertising by marketing orders. The study first examines horizontal competition when the competing advertiser is...

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Main Authors: James H. Cardon, Rulon D. Pope
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Agricultural Economics Association 2003-08-01
Series:Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31098
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spelling doaj-c03b0e75a75f4d9f8abe91bb3c3e22322020-11-25T01:10:22ZengWestern Agricultural Economics AssociationJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics1068-55022327-82852003-08-0128218520010.22004/ag.econ.3109831098Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and WelfareJames H. CardonRulon D. PopeThis analysis begins with a definition and discussion of productive advertising. Then, following Dixit and Norman, persuasive advertising is used to study the welfare effects of generic advertising by marketing orders. The study first examines horizontal competition when the competing advertiser is a monopoly, and results show that the socially optimal level of advertising for a competitive marketing order is positive only if advertising raises monopoly output. Next, advertising choices of a marketing order which sells its output to a monopolistic distributor are considered. If the distributor is a monopolist, then marketing order advertising raises welfare. This finding is in marked contrast to the results for the horizontal case studied by Dixit and Norman.https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31098advertisingmarket structurewelfare
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author James H. Cardon
Rulon D. Pope
spellingShingle James H. Cardon
Rulon D. Pope
Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
advertising
market structure
welfare
author_facet James H. Cardon
Rulon D. Pope
author_sort James H. Cardon
title Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
title_short Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
title_full Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
title_fullStr Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
title_full_unstemmed Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare
title_sort agricultural market structure, generic advertising, and welfare
publisher Western Agricultural Economics Association
series Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
issn 1068-5502
2327-8285
publishDate 2003-08-01
description This analysis begins with a definition and discussion of productive advertising. Then, following Dixit and Norman, persuasive advertising is used to study the welfare effects of generic advertising by marketing orders. The study first examines horizontal competition when the competing advertiser is a monopoly, and results show that the socially optimal level of advertising for a competitive marketing order is positive only if advertising raises monopoly output. Next, advertising choices of a marketing order which sells its output to a monopolistic distributor are considered. If the distributor is a monopolist, then marketing order advertising raises welfare. This finding is in marked contrast to the results for the horizontal case studied by Dixit and Norman.
topic advertising
market structure
welfare
url https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31098
work_keys_str_mv AT jameshcardon agriculturalmarketstructuregenericadvertisingandwelfare
AT rulondpope agriculturalmarketstructuregenericadvertisingandwelfare
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