A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would...
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doaj-c1f9f420d5c74c9bbde304984001d9272020-11-25T00:19:00ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782015-02-01510.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588123666A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmapMichael H Connors0Michael H Connors1Michael H Connors2Michael H Connors3Peter W Halligan4Peter W Halligan5ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its DisordersMacquarie UniversityUniversity of New South WalesUniversity of SydneyARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its DisordersCardiff UniversityOver the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g. vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588/fulldelusionBeliefbelief formationschemacognitive neuropsychiatry |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Peter W Halligan Peter W Halligan |
spellingShingle |
Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Peter W Halligan Peter W Halligan A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap Frontiers in Psychology delusion Belief belief formation schema cognitive neuropsychiatry |
author_facet |
Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Michael H Connors Peter W Halligan Peter W Halligan |
author_sort |
Michael H Connors |
title |
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap |
title_short |
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap |
title_full |
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap |
title_fullStr |
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap |
title_full_unstemmed |
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap |
title_sort |
cognitive account of belief: a tentative roadmap |
publisher |
Frontiers Media S.A. |
series |
Frontiers in Psychology |
issn |
1664-1078 |
publishDate |
2015-02-01 |
description |
Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g. vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief. |
topic |
delusion Belief belief formation schema cognitive neuropsychiatry |
url |
http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588/full |
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