A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap

Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would...

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Main Authors: Michael H Connors, Peter W Halligan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2015-02-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588/full
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spelling doaj-c1f9f420d5c74c9bbde304984001d9272020-11-25T00:19:00ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782015-02-01510.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588123666A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmapMichael H Connors0Michael H Connors1Michael H Connors2Michael H Connors3Peter W Halligan4Peter W Halligan5ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its DisordersMacquarie UniversityUniversity of New South WalesUniversity of SydneyARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its DisordersCardiff UniversityOver the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g. vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588/fulldelusionBeliefbelief formationschemacognitive neuropsychiatry
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Peter W Halligan
Peter W Halligan
spellingShingle Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Peter W Halligan
Peter W Halligan
A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
Frontiers in Psychology
delusion
Belief
belief formation
schema
cognitive neuropsychiatry
author_facet Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Michael H Connors
Peter W Halligan
Peter W Halligan
author_sort Michael H Connors
title A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
title_short A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
title_full A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
title_fullStr A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
title_full_unstemmed A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap
title_sort cognitive account of belief: a tentative roadmap
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
series Frontiers in Psychology
issn 1664-1078
publishDate 2015-02-01
description Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g. vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief.
topic delusion
Belief
belief formation
schema
cognitive neuropsychiatry
url http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588/full
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