Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory

Fernández (2019) offers an account of the nature of episodic memory that marries two core ideas: (i) role-functionalism about episodic memory, and (ii) self-reflexive mnemonic content. One payoff of this view is that episodic memory judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Fernánde...

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Main Author: Steven James
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: Universidad de Antioquía 2021-07-01
Series:Estudios de Filosofía
Subjects:
Online Access:https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/estudios_de_filosofia/article/view/345132
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spelling doaj-c4edd02a334d47e1b640946b71bc1e642021-08-09T19:53:56ZspaUniversidad de AntioquíaEstudios de Filosofía0121-36282256-358X2021-07-0164189200https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a10Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memorySteven James0West Chester University of PennsylvaniaFernández (2019) offers an account of the nature of episodic memory that marries two core ideas: (i) role-functionalism about episodic memory, and (ii) self-reflexive mnemonic content. One payoff of this view is that episodic memory judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Fernández takes this to reveal something important about the nature of one’s self-awareness in memory and our first-person conception of ourselves. However, once one sees why such judgments are immune in this way, according to the proposed account, the fact that they are immune becomes moot. While technically immune to error through misidentification, episodic memory judgments are not grounded in a way such that they have any interesting epistemological import for the subject (in contrast to other paradigms of such judgments), and any insights about our self-awareness and self-conception are directly derivable from the metaphysics of memory content alone.https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/estudios_de_filosofia/article/view/345132immunity to error through misidentificationmemory judgmentsepisodic memoryself-awarenessmetaphysics of memory
collection DOAJ
language Spanish
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Steven James
spellingShingle Steven James
Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
Estudios de Filosofía
immunity to error through misidentification
memory judgments
episodic memory
self-awareness
metaphysics of memory
author_facet Steven James
author_sort Steven James
title Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
title_short Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
title_full Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
title_fullStr Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
title_full_unstemmed Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
title_sort immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory
publisher Universidad de Antioquía
series Estudios de Filosofía
issn 0121-3628
2256-358X
publishDate 2021-07-01
description Fernández (2019) offers an account of the nature of episodic memory that marries two core ideas: (i) role-functionalism about episodic memory, and (ii) self-reflexive mnemonic content. One payoff of this view is that episodic memory judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Fernández takes this to reveal something important about the nature of one’s self-awareness in memory and our first-person conception of ourselves. However, once one sees why such judgments are immune in this way, according to the proposed account, the fact that they are immune becomes moot. While technically immune to error through misidentification, episodic memory judgments are not grounded in a way such that they have any interesting epistemological import for the subject (in contrast to other paradigms of such judgments), and any insights about our self-awareness and self-conception are directly derivable from the metaphysics of memory content alone.
topic immunity to error through misidentification
memory judgments
episodic memory
self-awareness
metaphysics of memory
url https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/estudios_de_filosofia/article/view/345132
work_keys_str_mv AT stevenjames immunitytoerrorthroughmisidentificationandthefunctionalistselfreflexiveaccountofepisodicmemory
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