Aspect-Perception as a Philosophical Method

Inducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conc...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Reshef Agam-Segal
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nordic Wittgenstein Society 2015-07-01
Series:Nordic Wittgenstein Review
Online Access:http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3252
Description
Summary:Inducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conceptual routine. We can use that experience to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and re-evaluate the ways we make sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other standard Wittgensteinian philosophical methods.
ISSN:2194-6825
2242-248X