Effect of Horizontal-Agency-Costs and Managerial Ownership on Monitoring Mechanisms
There is a level of information asymmetry between the agents (management and the board of directors) and the principal (shareholders) in every company. The purpose of this study is to examine the scope of monitoring mechanisms in non-financial listed companies of Nigeria. This paper also investigat...
Main Authors: | Rachael Oluyemisi Arowolo, Ayoib Che-Ahmad |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
EconJournals
2016-10-01
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Series: | International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijefi/issue/32000/353057?publisher=http-www-cag-edu-tr-ilhan-ozturk |
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