Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>In 2004, a community-based health insurance scheme (CBI) was introduced in Nouna health district, Burkina Faso. Since its inception, coverage has remained low and dropout rates high. One important reason for low coverage and high dro...

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Main Authors: Robyn Paul, Bärnighausen Till, Souares Aurélia, Savadogo Germain, Bicaba Brice, Sié Ali, Sauerborn Rainer
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: BMC 2012-06-01
Series:BMC Health Services Research
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/159
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spelling doaj-cbdb5d7fa7b245028b7b1fabe3b52a0f2020-11-25T00:14:38ZengBMCBMC Health Services Research1472-69632012-06-0112115910.1186/1472-6963-12-159Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experimentRobyn PaulBärnighausen TillSouares AuréliaSavadogo GermainBicaba BriceSié AliSauerborn Rainer<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>In 2004, a community-based health insurance scheme (CBI) was introduced in Nouna health district, Burkina Faso. Since its inception, coverage has remained low and dropout rates high. One important reason for low coverage and high dropout is that health workers do not support the CBI scheme because they are dissatisfied with the provider payment mechanism of the CBI.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was used to examine CBI provider payment attributes that influence health workers’ stated preferences for payment mechanisms. The DCE was conducted among 176 health workers employed at one of the 34 primary care facilities or the district hospital in Nouna health district. Conditional logit models with main effects and interactions terms were used for analysis.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Reimbursement of service fees (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 1.49, p < 0.001) and CBI contributions for medical supplies and equipment (aOR 1.47, p < 0.001) had the strongest effect on whether the health workers chose a given provider payment mechanism. The odds of selecting a payment mechanism decreased significantly if the mechanism included (i) results-based financing (RBF) payments made through the local health management team (instead of directly to the health workers (aOR 0.86, p < 0.001)) or (ii) RBF payments based on CBI coverage achieved in the health worker’s facility relative to the coverage achieved at other facilities (instead of payments based on the numbers of individuals or households enrolled at the health worker’s facility (aOR 0.86, p < 0.001)).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Provider payment mechanisms can crucially determine CBI performance. Based on the results from this DCE, revised CBI payment mechanisms were introduced in Nouna health district in January 2011, taking into consideration health worker preferences on how they are paid.</p> http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/159Health insuranceHealth workersThird-party payersChoice behaviourBurkina Faso
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Robyn Paul
Bärnighausen Till
Souares Aurélia
Savadogo Germain
Bicaba Brice
Sié Ali
Sauerborn Rainer
spellingShingle Robyn Paul
Bärnighausen Till
Souares Aurélia
Savadogo Germain
Bicaba Brice
Sié Ali
Sauerborn Rainer
Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
BMC Health Services Research
Health insurance
Health workers
Third-party payers
Choice behaviour
Burkina Faso
author_facet Robyn Paul
Bärnighausen Till
Souares Aurélia
Savadogo Germain
Bicaba Brice
Sié Ali
Sauerborn Rainer
author_sort Robyn Paul
title Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
title_short Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
title_full Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
title_fullStr Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
title_full_unstemmed Health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
title_sort health worker preferences for community-based health insurance payment mechanisms: a discrete choice experiment
publisher BMC
series BMC Health Services Research
issn 1472-6963
publishDate 2012-06-01
description <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>In 2004, a community-based health insurance scheme (CBI) was introduced in Nouna health district, Burkina Faso. Since its inception, coverage has remained low and dropout rates high. One important reason for low coverage and high dropout is that health workers do not support the CBI scheme because they are dissatisfied with the provider payment mechanism of the CBI.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was used to examine CBI provider payment attributes that influence health workers’ stated preferences for payment mechanisms. The DCE was conducted among 176 health workers employed at one of the 34 primary care facilities or the district hospital in Nouna health district. Conditional logit models with main effects and interactions terms were used for analysis.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Reimbursement of service fees (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 1.49, p < 0.001) and CBI contributions for medical supplies and equipment (aOR 1.47, p < 0.001) had the strongest effect on whether the health workers chose a given provider payment mechanism. The odds of selecting a payment mechanism decreased significantly if the mechanism included (i) results-based financing (RBF) payments made through the local health management team (instead of directly to the health workers (aOR 0.86, p < 0.001)) or (ii) RBF payments based on CBI coverage achieved in the health worker’s facility relative to the coverage achieved at other facilities (instead of payments based on the numbers of individuals or households enrolled at the health worker’s facility (aOR 0.86, p < 0.001)).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Provider payment mechanisms can crucially determine CBI performance. Based on the results from this DCE, revised CBI payment mechanisms were introduced in Nouna health district in January 2011, taking into consideration health worker preferences on how they are paid.</p>
topic Health insurance
Health workers
Third-party payers
Choice behaviour
Burkina Faso
url http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/159
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