Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law

Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law

The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cogniti...

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Main Authors: Delamar José Volpato Dutra, Nythamar de Oliveira
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2017-12-01
Series:Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
Subjects:
habermas
positivism
moral cognitivism
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/54870
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spelling doaj-d1274cf02f524a58a948d9a8b4f7085e2021-04-02T13:56:24ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542017-12-0116353354610.5007/1677-2954.2017v16n3p53328454Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of LawDelamar José Volpato Dutra0Nythamar de Oliveira1Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC)Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUCRS)The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/54870habermaspositivismmoral cognitivism
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Delamar José Volpato Dutra
Nythamar de Oliveira
spellingShingle Delamar José Volpato Dutra
Nythamar de Oliveira
Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
habermas
positivism
moral cognitivism
author_facet Delamar José Volpato Dutra
Nythamar de Oliveira
author_sort Delamar José Volpato Dutra
title Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
title_short Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
title_full Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
title_fullStr Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
title_full_unstemmed Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
title_sort moral cognitivism and legal positivism in habermas’s and kant's philosophy of law
publisher Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
series Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
issn 1677-2954
publishDate 2017-12-01
description The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.
topic habermas
positivism
moral cognitivism
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/54870
work_keys_str_mv AT delamarjosevolpatodutra moralcognitivismandlegalpositivisminhabermassandkantsphilosophyoflaw
AT nythamardeoliveira moralcognitivismandlegalpositivisminhabermassandkantsphilosophyoflaw
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