La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano

This work tries to demonstrate, in first place, that the “gnoseological” approach to the question for the science defended by Gustavo Bueno in fact only fits in the gnoseological materialism, the theory proposed by Bueno, while adequationism, theoreticism and descriptionsm would be theories of the s...

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Main Authors: Juan B. Fuentes, Natalia S. García Pérez
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Universidad Complutense de Madrid 2007-06-01
Series:Logos
Subjects:
Online Access:http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASEM/article/view/16392
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spelling doaj-d305c61a02b14e0e8c2647f955e742972020-11-24T23:59:32ZdeuUniversidad Complutense de MadridLogos1575-68661988-32422007-06-014011913916407La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesianoJuan B. FuentesNatalia S. García PérezThis work tries to demonstrate, in first place, that the “gnoseological” approach to the question for the science defended by Gustavo Bueno in fact only fits in the gnoseological materialism, the theory proposed by Bueno, while adequationism, theoreticism and descriptionsm would be theories of the science that genuinely would adopt the “epistemological” approach. In second place, we sustain that the epistemological and gnoseological approaches are generated in the soul/body alternative outlined by Cartesian dualism, because while the first one conceives the subject that makes the sciences as a mere mind that operates with propositions or concepts “about the things”, the second one understands it as a (soulless) mechanical body that builds the sciences operating “with the things themselves”. Since in Descartes the soul is the instance that knows, the option for the body of the gnoseological materialism explains its (self) positioning regardless of the question of knowledge. Lastly, we examine some problems that this Cartesian notion of subject implicates for the gnoseological materialism’s conception of “human and ethological sciences”.http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASEM/article/view/16392Epistemological and gnoseological approaches to the idea of sciencegnoseological materialismsoul/body Cartesian dualism&quothuman sciences&quot
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Juan B. Fuentes
Natalia S. García Pérez
spellingShingle Juan B. Fuentes
Natalia S. García Pérez
La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
Logos
Epistemological and gnoseological approaches to the idea of science
gnoseological materialism
soul/body Cartesian dualism
&quot
human sciences&quot
author_facet Juan B. Fuentes
Natalia S. García Pérez
author_sort Juan B. Fuentes
title La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
title_short La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
title_full La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
title_fullStr La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
title_full_unstemmed La raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
title_sort la raíz común de los enfoques “epistemológico” y “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia del materialismo gnoseológico: el dualismo cartesiano
publisher Universidad Complutense de Madrid
series Logos
issn 1575-6866
1988-3242
publishDate 2007-06-01
description This work tries to demonstrate, in first place, that the “gnoseological” approach to the question for the science defended by Gustavo Bueno in fact only fits in the gnoseological materialism, the theory proposed by Bueno, while adequationism, theoreticism and descriptionsm would be theories of the science that genuinely would adopt the “epistemological” approach. In second place, we sustain that the epistemological and gnoseological approaches are generated in the soul/body alternative outlined by Cartesian dualism, because while the first one conceives the subject that makes the sciences as a mere mind that operates with propositions or concepts “about the things”, the second one understands it as a (soulless) mechanical body that builds the sciences operating “with the things themselves”. Since in Descartes the soul is the instance that knows, the option for the body of the gnoseological materialism explains its (self) positioning regardless of the question of knowledge. Lastly, we examine some problems that this Cartesian notion of subject implicates for the gnoseological materialism’s conception of “human and ethological sciences”.
topic Epistemological and gnoseological approaches to the idea of science
gnoseological materialism
soul/body Cartesian dualism
&quot
human sciences&quot
url http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASEM/article/view/16392
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