Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.

Copying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous work has demonstrated young children's selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The current study examined children's flexibility in fo...

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Main Author: Shiri Einav
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2014-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4130602?pdf=render
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spelling doaj-d338a19b34574644a3467bb9a3030df32020-11-25T02:33:33ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032014-01-0198e10458510.1371/journal.pone.0104585Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.Shiri EinavCopying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous work has demonstrated young children's selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The current study examined children's flexibility in following the majority: do they overextend their reliance on this heuristic to situations where the dissenting individual has privileged knowledge and should be trusted instead? Four- to six- year-olds (N = 103) heard conflicting claims about the identity of hidden drawings from a majority and a dissenter in two between-subject conditions: in one, the dissenter had privileged knowledge over the majority (he drew the pictures); in the other he did not (they were drawn by an absent third party). Overall, children were less likely to trust the majority in the Privileged Dissenter condition. Moreover, 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures. The current findings suggest that by 5 years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than automatically following the most common view.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4130602?pdf=render
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Shiri Einav
spellingShingle Shiri Einav
Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Shiri Einav
author_sort Shiri Einav
title Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
title_short Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
title_full Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
title_fullStr Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
title_full_unstemmed Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
title_sort does the majority always know best? young children's flexible trust in majority opinion.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2014-01-01
description Copying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous work has demonstrated young children's selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The current study examined children's flexibility in following the majority: do they overextend their reliance on this heuristic to situations where the dissenting individual has privileged knowledge and should be trusted instead? Four- to six- year-olds (N = 103) heard conflicting claims about the identity of hidden drawings from a majority and a dissenter in two between-subject conditions: in one, the dissenter had privileged knowledge over the majority (he drew the pictures); in the other he did not (they were drawn by an absent third party). Overall, children were less likely to trust the majority in the Privileged Dissenter condition. Moreover, 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures. The current findings suggest that by 5 years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than automatically following the most common view.
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4130602?pdf=render
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