How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That in...
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Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
2020-12-01
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Online Access: | https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384 |
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doaj-d7792bd5d552445cae3cf503d99827fc2021-01-19T06:11:31ZengKorea Institute for International Economic PolicyEast Asian Economic Review2508-16402508-16672020-12-01244349388How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with ChinaChad P. Bown0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6963-7857Peterson Institute for International EconomicsThe US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms.https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384 export restrictionssupply chainsnational securitysemiconductorshuaweismicus–china trade relations |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Chad P. Bown |
spellingShingle |
Chad P. Bown How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China East Asian Economic Review export restrictions supply chains national security semiconductors huawei smic us–china trade relations |
author_facet |
Chad P. Bown |
author_sort |
Chad P. Bown |
title |
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China |
title_short |
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China |
title_full |
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China |
title_fullStr |
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China |
title_full_unstemmed |
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China |
title_sort |
how the united states marched the semiconductor industry into its trade war with china |
publisher |
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy |
series |
East Asian Economic Review |
issn |
2508-1640 2508-1667 |
publishDate |
2020-12-01 |
description |
The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms. |
topic |
export restrictions supply chains national security semiconductors huawei smic us–china trade relations |
url |
https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT chadpbown howtheunitedstatesmarchedthesemiconductorindustryintoitstradewarwithchina |
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1724332656201564160 |