How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China

The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That in...

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Main Author: Chad P. Bown
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2020-12-01
Series:East Asian Economic Review
Subjects:
Online Access:https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384
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spelling doaj-d7792bd5d552445cae3cf503d99827fc2021-01-19T06:11:31ZengKorea Institute for International Economic PolicyEast Asian Economic Review2508-16402508-16672020-12-01244349388How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with ChinaChad P. Bown0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6963-7857Peterson Institute for International EconomicsThe US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms.https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384 export restrictionssupply chainsnational securitysemiconductorshuaweismicus–china trade relations
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Chad P. Bown
spellingShingle Chad P. Bown
How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
East Asian Economic Review
export restrictions
supply chains
national security
semiconductors
huawei
smic
us–china trade relations
author_facet Chad P. Bown
author_sort Chad P. Bown
title How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
title_short How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
title_full How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
title_fullStr How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
title_full_unstemmed How the United States Marched the Semiconductor Industry into Its Trade War with China
title_sort how the united states marched the semiconductor industry into its trade war with china
publisher Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
series East Asian Economic Review
issn 2508-1640
2508-1667
publishDate 2020-12-01
description The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms.
topic export restrictions
supply chains
national security
semiconductors
huawei
smic
us–china trade relations
url https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2020.24.4.384
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