Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence resu...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Econometric Society
2006-03-01
|
| Series: | Theoretical Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060095/449/13 |
| id |
doaj-d7a708ffe4f74b1c90764513b6cfcf73 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
Article |
| spelling |
doaj-d7a708ffe4f74b1c90764513b6cfcf732020-11-24T23:59:35ZengEconometric SocietyTheoretical Economics1555-75612006-03-011195118Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary typesYeon-Koo CheIan GaleThis paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060095/449/13Auctionsmultidimensional types and atomsrisk aversionGateaux differentiable preferencesC70D44 |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Yeon-Koo Che Ian Gale |
| spellingShingle |
Yeon-Koo Che Ian Gale Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types Theoretical Economics Auctions multidimensional types and atoms risk aversion Gateaux differentiable preferences C70 D44 |
| author_facet |
Yeon-Koo Che Ian Gale |
| author_sort |
Yeon-Koo Che |
| title |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| title_short |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| title_full |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| title_fullStr |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| title_sort |
revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
| publisher |
Econometric Society |
| series |
Theoretical Economics |
| issn |
1555-7561 |
| publishDate |
2006-03-01 |
| description |
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences. |
| topic |
Auctions multidimensional types and atoms risk aversion Gateaux differentiable preferences C70 D44 |
| url |
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060095/449/13 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT yeonkooche revenuecomparisonsforauctionswhenbiddershavearbitrarytypes AT iangale revenuecomparisonsforauctionswhenbiddershavearbitrarytypes |
| _version_ |
1725447262775017472 |