Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence resu...
Main Authors: | Yeon-Koo Che, Ian Gale |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Econometric Society
2006-03-01
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Series: | Theoretical Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060095/449/13 |
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