A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems
This paper proposes a secure offline electronic (e-) payment scheme by adopting Schnorr's untraceable blind signature (BS). Thereby, to satisfy the essential security requirements of e-payment systems, it requires much more simple computations and becomes more practical than many existing schem...
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2021-12-01
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doaj-da20eda2c00e4b6a82b7ced3b8e226c62021-09-07T04:14:36ZengElsevierHigh-Confidence Computing2667-29522021-12-0112100031A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systemsMd. Abdullah Al Rahat Kutubi0Kazi Md. Rokibul Alam1Yasuhiko Morimoto2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Khulna University of Engineering & Technology, Khulna 9203, Bangladesh; Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Bangladesh Army University of Engineering and Technology, BangladeshDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Khulna University of Engineering & Technology, Khulna 9203, Bangladesh; Corresponding author.Graduate School of Advanced Science and Engineering, Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8521, JapanThis paper proposes a secure offline electronic (e-) payment scheme by adopting Schnorr's untraceable blind signature (BS). Thereby, to satisfy the essential security requirements of e-payment systems, it requires much more simple computations and becomes more practical than many existing schemes. Other considerations are: to prevent the forgery of e-coin, the Bank is only the lawful entity to produce the valid e-coin; and others can verify its correctness. To confirm no swindling, the e-coin owner also sticks her private signing key with the e-coin before spending it as the payment. Hence, through the commitment with challenge-response of Schnorr's BS, the merchant can verify the spent e-coin, and the trusted authority can identify the dishonest spender if multiple spending occurs. Moreover, it embeds three distinct information of date, namely expiration, deposit, and transaction dates with every e-coin. Thereby, it minimizes the size of the Bank's database, correctly calculates the interest of the e-coin, and helps in arbiter if multiple spending, respectively. Finally, it evaluates the performance and analyzes essential security requirements of the proposed scheme, plus studies a comparison with existing ones.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667295221000210Offline electronic paymentSchnorr's blind signatureRSA algorithmZero-knowledge proofUntraceability |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Md. Abdullah Al Rahat Kutubi Kazi Md. Rokibul Alam Yasuhiko Morimoto |
spellingShingle |
Md. Abdullah Al Rahat Kutubi Kazi Md. Rokibul Alam Yasuhiko Morimoto A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems High-Confidence Computing Offline electronic payment Schnorr's blind signature RSA algorithm Zero-knowledge proof Untraceability |
author_facet |
Md. Abdullah Al Rahat Kutubi Kazi Md. Rokibul Alam Yasuhiko Morimoto |
author_sort |
Md. Abdullah Al Rahat Kutubi |
title |
A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
title_short |
A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
title_full |
A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
title_fullStr |
A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
title_full_unstemmed |
A simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
title_sort |
simplified scheme for secure offline electronic payment systems |
publisher |
Elsevier |
series |
High-Confidence Computing |
issn |
2667-2952 |
publishDate |
2021-12-01 |
description |
This paper proposes a secure offline electronic (e-) payment scheme by adopting Schnorr's untraceable blind signature (BS). Thereby, to satisfy the essential security requirements of e-payment systems, it requires much more simple computations and becomes more practical than many existing schemes. Other considerations are: to prevent the forgery of e-coin, the Bank is only the lawful entity to produce the valid e-coin; and others can verify its correctness. To confirm no swindling, the e-coin owner also sticks her private signing key with the e-coin before spending it as the payment. Hence, through the commitment with challenge-response of Schnorr's BS, the merchant can verify the spent e-coin, and the trusted authority can identify the dishonest spender if multiple spending occurs. Moreover, it embeds three distinct information of date, namely expiration, deposit, and transaction dates with every e-coin. Thereby, it minimizes the size of the Bank's database, correctly calculates the interest of the e-coin, and helps in arbiter if multiple spending, respectively. Finally, it evaluates the performance and analyzes essential security requirements of the proposed scheme, plus studies a comparison with existing ones. |
topic |
Offline electronic payment Schnorr's blind signature RSA algorithm Zero-knowledge proof Untraceability |
url |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667295221000210 |
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