Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power

We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters...

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Main Author: Basak Altan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-05-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/2/22
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spelling doaj-dab96281326243cbaaeb3458d7345cdf2020-11-25T02:37:47ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362020-05-0111222210.3390/g11020022Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market PowerBasak Altan0Department of Economics, Ozyegin University, 34794 Istanbul, TurkeyWe analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/2/22durable goodsmonopolypricingqualitydifferentiation
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Basak Altan
spellingShingle Basak Altan
Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
Games
durable goods
monopoly
pricing
quality
differentiation
author_facet Basak Altan
author_sort Basak Altan
title Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
title_short Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
title_full Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
title_fullStr Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
title_sort dynamic durable goods monopoly and market power
publisher MDPI AG
series Games
issn 2073-4336
publishDate 2020-05-01
description We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.
topic durable goods
monopoly
pricing
quality
differentiation
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/2/22
work_keys_str_mv AT basakaltan dynamicdurablegoodsmonopolyandmarketpower
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