Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers
This paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution...
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Hindawi Limited
2020-01-01
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Series: | Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8954262 |
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doaj-db6b7a49f54b4c8496eddb499a8ca01c2020-11-25T03:02:27ZengHindawi LimitedMathematical Problems in Engineering1024-123X1563-51472020-01-01202010.1155/2020/89542628954262Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic ManufacturersXuefeng Xia0Zhenkai Lou1Xiaozhen Dai2School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management, Wenzhou Business College, Zhejiang, ChinaThis paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is proposed. The change rate of the benefit function of environment with regard to purchasing preference proportions is examined. Second, we investigate the case in the presence of energy-saving incentive. A two-layer decision model is constructed by considering the decision order of each participant. Optimal strategies between the two cases are compared. We provide theoretical foundations for the government to formulate policies of energy-saving incentive under a financial budget constraint. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the obtained conclusions and make some supplements.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8954262 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Xuefeng Xia Zhenkai Lou Xiaozhen Dai |
spellingShingle |
Xuefeng Xia Zhenkai Lou Xiaozhen Dai Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
author_facet |
Xuefeng Xia Zhenkai Lou Xiaozhen Dai |
author_sort |
Xuefeng Xia |
title |
Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
title_short |
Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
title_full |
Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
title_fullStr |
Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
title_full_unstemmed |
Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
title_sort |
production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers |
publisher |
Hindawi Limited |
series |
Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
issn |
1024-123X 1563-5147 |
publishDate |
2020-01-01 |
description |
This paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is proposed. The change rate of the benefit function of environment with regard to purchasing preference proportions is examined. Second, we investigate the case in the presence of energy-saving incentive. A two-layer decision model is constructed by considering the decision order of each participant. Optimal strategies between the two cases are compared. We provide theoretical foundations for the government to formulate policies of energy-saving incentive under a financial budget constraint. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the obtained conclusions and make some supplements. |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8954262 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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1715321118780293120 |