Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small inf...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hsien-Pu Chen, Elias Gonzalez, Yessica Saez, Laszlo B. Kish
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2015-10-01
Series:Information
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/6/4/719
Description
Summary:The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak.
ISSN:2078-2489