Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design
We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality, Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We e...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2017-12-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v002-1/p_03.pdf
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| Summary: | We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality, Harku.
Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku was redesigned in 2016.
The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable matching, with priorities primarily
based on siblings and distance. We evaluate seven policy designs based on 2016 admission
data in order to understand efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the
descriptive data analysis, we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity
analysis using computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation
mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we vary how the
priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors. Different lotteries are
included for breaking ties. We find that different ways of considering the same priority
factors can have a significant aggregate effect on the allocation. Additionally, we survey
a dozen special features that can create significant challenges (both theoretical and
practical) in redesigning the allocation mechanism in Estonian Kindergartens, and
potentially elsewhere as well. |
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| ISSN: | 2399-844X 2399-8458 |