| Summary: | The article shows the history of the development by the German High Command of the plans of the Wehrmacht’s offensive operation in the south wing of the Soviet-German front for the spring-summer campaign of 1942. The objective of this paper is to elaborate on some individual aspects of the planning by the Nazi leadership of “Case Blue” (German – Fall Blau) and its subsequent realization. The result of this correction was a quick creation of the two new strategic plans: “Operation Braunschweig” – the offensive against Stalingrad and “Operation Edelweiss” – the offensive against the Caucasus. In the paper, the authors as a conclusion note that such dispersion of the armed forces of the German army led in the end to the shortage of forces for the realization of the both plans and the defeat of the Wehrmacht both in Stalingrad and in the battle of the Caucasus. The victories of the Red Army in those battles resulted in the radical turning-point at the entire Soviet-German front, in the beginning of the liberation of the Soviet territories from the German occupation troops.
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