The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain
This paper analyzes the selfish-mine strategy in the Bitcoin blockchain introduced in 2013 by I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. This strategy could be used by a colluding pool of miners to earn more than their fair share of the mining revenue and in consequence to force other honest miners to join them to de...
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KeAi Communications Co., Ltd.
2020-05-01
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doaj-e47bcc7f87c34ddc8b84ca771f5a2d932021-04-02T14:16:43ZengKeAi Communications Co., Ltd.Digital Communications and Networks2352-86482020-05-0162157166The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchainMoustapha BA0Corresponding author.; MODAL’X (Laboratoire de Modélisation aléatoire) of Université Paris Nanterre (Paris X), MODAL’X is the Mathematics and Computer Sciences laboratory of Université Paris Nanterre (Paris X), ministerial label EA 3454, UFR SEGMI, département Mathématiques-Informatique, 200 avenue de la République, 92000, Nanterre, FranceThis paper analyzes the selfish-mine strategy in the Bitcoin blockchain introduced in 2013 by I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. This strategy could be used by a colluding pool of miners to earn more than their fair share of the mining revenue and in consequence to force other honest miners to join them to decrease the variance of their revenues and make their monthly revenues more predictable. It is a very dangerous dynamic that could allow the rogue pool of miners to go toward a majority by accumulating powers of news adherents and control the entire network. Considering that the propagation delay of information between any two miners in the network, which is not negligible and follows a normal distribution with mean proportional to the physical distance between the two miners, and a constant variance independent of others' delays, we prove that no guarantee can be given about the success or failure of the selfish-mine attack because of the variability of information propagation in the network.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235286481830037360B0560G5590B1590B18 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Moustapha BA |
spellingShingle |
Moustapha BA The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain Digital Communications and Networks 60B05 60G55 90B15 90B18 |
author_facet |
Moustapha BA |
author_sort |
Moustapha BA |
title |
The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain |
title_short |
The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain |
title_full |
The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain |
title_fullStr |
The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain |
title_full_unstemmed |
The effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain |
title_sort |
effect of propagation delay on the dynamic evolution of the bitcoin blockchain |
publisher |
KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. |
series |
Digital Communications and Networks |
issn |
2352-8648 |
publishDate |
2020-05-01 |
description |
This paper analyzes the selfish-mine strategy in the Bitcoin blockchain introduced in 2013 by I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. This strategy could be used by a colluding pool of miners to earn more than their fair share of the mining revenue and in consequence to force other honest miners to join them to decrease the variance of their revenues and make their monthly revenues more predictable. It is a very dangerous dynamic that could allow the rogue pool of miners to go toward a majority by accumulating powers of news adherents and control the entire network. Considering that the propagation delay of information between any two miners in the network, which is not negligible and follows a normal distribution with mean proportional to the physical distance between the two miners, and a constant variance independent of others' delays, we prove that no guarantee can be given about the success or failure of the selfish-mine attack because of the variability of information propagation in the network. |
topic |
60B05 60G55 90B15 90B18 |
url |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352864818300373 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT moustaphaba theeffectofpropagationdelayonthedynamicevolutionofthebitcoinblockchain AT moustaphaba effectofpropagationdelayonthedynamicevolutionofthebitcoinblockchain |
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