Ananlysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Power Dominance between Single Manufacturer and Single Retailer in Regulatory Cap and Trade System
In the cap and trade system, the paper analyses the Stackelberg game between the power asymmetrical retailer and manufacturer and designs a side-payment self-enforcing contract to resolve some arguments that the existing research overemphasizes spontaneity of participation in side-payment contracts...
Main Authors: | Liang-jie Xia, Hua-wei Zhi |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Hindawi Limited
2014-01-01
|
Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/523451 |
Similar Items
-
The Optimal Carbon Emission Reduction and Prices with Cap and Trade Mechanism and Competition
by: Linghong Zhang, et al.
Published: (2018-11-01) -
The important factors of ananlysis for the status of health elders
by: Ying-yu Lin, et al.
Published: (2007) -
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND AUTO-ANANLYSIS: IS IT A POSSIBLE ARTICULATION?
by: CAMILA ANDRADE DRUBSCKY
Published: (2003) -
The Multi-Period Dynamic Optimization with Carbon Emissions Reduction under Cap-and-Trade
by: Baiyun Yuan, et al.
Published: (2019-01-01) -
Empirical Bayes Test in Two-Sample Survival Ananlysis
by: Hsu Min Chih, et al.
Published: (1993)