| Summary: | In the land requisition market in China, two very different compensation levels for land requisition can be seen in the real world: one is the highly rigid official compensation level for land requisition and the other is a fuzzy actual compensation level for land requisition. In order to uncover the determinants of the actual compensation level for land requisition in China, this paper adopts Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to analyze the causal relationship between nonmarketization bargaining factors, like land-losing farmers’ bargaining ability, bargaining strategy, external intervention, etc., and the actual compensation level for land requisition by taking 70 land requisition conflict events occurring from 2002 to 2017 as the point of departure. The results of the empirical analysis show that if land-losing farmers have a relatively strong bargaining ability, forgo a radical bargaining strategy, and use a relatively gentle bargaining strategy instead, they can effectively force local governments to make concessions and compromises on the compensation level for land requisition. This paper not only enriches the existing research on the structure of social power, but it also has significance for the ongoing reform of the land requisition system.
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