If phrónêsis does not develop and define virtue as its own deliberative goal — what does?

• Main Author: Olav Eikeland
• Format: Article
• Language: deu
• Published: Axia Academic Publishers 2016-12-01
• Series: Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics
• Subjects: Aristotle, deliberation, dialectics, habit, imagination, phrónêsis, virtue
• Online Access: http://www.axiapublishers.com/ojs/index.php/labyrinth/article/view/46

The article discusses relationships and contexts for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland (2008). It positions Eikeland (2008) in relation to Moss (2011, 2012, 2014) but with a side view to Cammick (2013), Kristjansson (2014), and Taylor (2016). These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phrónêsis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical.