Optimal auction mechanisms with private values
This paper reviews equilibrium behavior in different auction mechanisms. We will deal with two types of open auctions, English and Dutch, and two types of sealed-bid auctions, first-price and second-price, when there is a single object for sale and bidders have private values. We show that under cer...
Main Author: | Trifunović Dejan |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Faculty of Economics, Belgrade
2010-01-01
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Series: | Ekonomski Anali |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0013-3264/2010/0013-32641084071T.pdf |
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