The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies

• Main Author: David Goodwin
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: University of Windsor 1992-01-01
• Series: Informal Logic
• Subjects: informal logic; argumentation history and theory; rhetorical theory; dialectic
• Online Access: https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2522

Arguments about fallacies generally attempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of argumentation and reasoning. To examine the structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores the connection between Nicholas Rescher's concept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments about fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, primarily with a view to analyzing its underlying strategies of argumentation. Finally, it examines how second-order distinctions (those designed to challenge previously formulated distinctions) underpin current arguments against the Aristotelian or "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies.