Mind, Davidson and Reality

• Main Author: Daniel Laurier
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2005-12-01
• Series: Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
• Subjects: Realism; intentionality; objectivity; dependence; Davidson
• Online Access: http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14609/13357

The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irreal-ism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of in-tentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be at-tributed to Davidson.