Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.

In human societies, agents are assumed to experience being the author of their own actions. These basic motoric experiences of action are influenced by social hierarchies, leading to surprising and morally significant results. Here we ask whether, under coercion, the sense of agency and responsibili...

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Main Authors: Emilie A Caspar, Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Haggard
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2018-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6157880?pdf=render
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spelling doaj-f48184f89e5c4f6e863be0a8685afdaf2020-11-25T01:19:50ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032018-01-01139e020402710.1371/journal.pone.0204027Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.Emilie A CasparAxel CleeremansPatrick HaggardIn human societies, agents are assumed to experience being the author of their own actions. These basic motoric experiences of action are influenced by social hierarchies, leading to surprising and morally significant results. Here we ask whether, under coercion, the sense of agency and responsibility pass from the person who receives orders to the person who gives them. Volunteers took turns to play the roles of 'commander', 'agent' or 'victim' in a task where the commander coerced the agent to deliver painful shocks to the 'victim'. We used 'intentional binding' as an implicit measure of sense of agency in both commanders and agents, in conditions of coercion and free-choice. We observed a reduced sense of agency when agents received coercive instructions, relative to when they freely chose which action to execute. We also found that sense of agency in the commanders was reduced when they coerced agents to administer the shock on their behalf, relative to when they acted by themselves. This last effect was associated with the commander's self-reported level on a psychopathy scale. Thus, coercion resulted in neither commander nor agent feeling agency for the effect of the action, as measured through implicit methods. Our results could have profound implications for social decision-making and social regulation of moral behaviour.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6157880?pdf=render
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Emilie A Caspar
Axel Cleeremans
Patrick Haggard
spellingShingle Emilie A Caspar
Axel Cleeremans
Patrick Haggard
Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Emilie A Caspar
Axel Cleeremans
Patrick Haggard
author_sort Emilie A Caspar
title Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
title_short Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
title_full Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
title_fullStr Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
title_full_unstemmed Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
title_sort only giving orders? an experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2018-01-01
description In human societies, agents are assumed to experience being the author of their own actions. These basic motoric experiences of action are influenced by social hierarchies, leading to surprising and morally significant results. Here we ask whether, under coercion, the sense of agency and responsibility pass from the person who receives orders to the person who gives them. Volunteers took turns to play the roles of 'commander', 'agent' or 'victim' in a task where the commander coerced the agent to deliver painful shocks to the 'victim'. We used 'intentional binding' as an implicit measure of sense of agency in both commanders and agents, in conditions of coercion and free-choice. We observed a reduced sense of agency when agents received coercive instructions, relative to when they freely chose which action to execute. We also found that sense of agency in the commanders was reduced when they coerced agents to administer the shock on their behalf, relative to when they acted by themselves. This last effect was associated with the commander's self-reported level on a psychopathy scale. Thus, coercion resulted in neither commander nor agent feeling agency for the effect of the action, as measured through implicit methods. Our results could have profound implications for social decision-making and social regulation of moral behaviour.
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6157880?pdf=render
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