Beliefs and social behavior in a multi-period ultimatum game
We conduct a multi-period ultimatum game in which we elicit players’ beliefs. Responders do not predict accurately the amount that will be offered to them, and do not get better in their predictions over time. At the individual level we see some effect of the mistake in expectations in the previous...
Main Authors: | Ofer Haim Azar, Yaron eLahav, Alisa eVoslinsky |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2015-02-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00029/full |
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