Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framewor...
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014 |
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doaj-f55c30bfc6604a4b85aaed94ff9af3362021-09-05T20:51:23ZengDe GruyterOpen Philosophy2543-88752018-09-011119121210.1515/opphil-2018-0014opphil-2018-0014Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of ThingsGamez Patrick0Missouri University of Science and Technology,Missiori, United States of AmericaIn this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival of metaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate new metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better.https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014speculative realismvital materialismenvironmental ethicsnon-anthropocentrismbachelardalthussercontinental philosophy |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Gamez Patrick |
spellingShingle |
Gamez Patrick Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things Open Philosophy speculative realism vital materialism environmental ethics non-anthropocentrism bachelard althusser continental philosophy |
author_facet |
Gamez Patrick |
author_sort |
Gamez Patrick |
title |
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things |
title_short |
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things |
title_full |
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things |
title_fullStr |
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things |
title_full_unstemmed |
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things |
title_sort |
metaphysics or metaphors for the anthropocene? scientific naturalism and the agency of things |
publisher |
De Gruyter |
series |
Open Philosophy |
issn |
2543-8875 |
publishDate |
2018-09-01 |
description |
In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival of metaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate new metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better. |
topic |
speculative realism vital materialism environmental ethics non-anthropocentrism bachelard althusser continental philosophy |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT gamezpatrick metaphysicsormetaphorsfortheanthropocenescientificnaturalismandtheagencyofthings |
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1717783933674848256 |