Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things

In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framewor...

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Main Author: Gamez Patrick
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2018-09-01
Series:Open Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014
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spelling doaj-f55c30bfc6604a4b85aaed94ff9af3362021-09-05T20:51:23ZengDe GruyterOpen Philosophy2543-88752018-09-011119121210.1515/opphil-2018-0014opphil-2018-0014Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of ThingsGamez Patrick0Missouri University of Science and Technology,Missiori, United States of AmericaIn this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival of metaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate new metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better.https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014speculative realismvital materialismenvironmental ethicsnon-anthropocentrismbachelardalthussercontinental philosophy
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Gamez Patrick
spellingShingle Gamez Patrick
Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
Open Philosophy
speculative realism
vital materialism
environmental ethics
non-anthropocentrism
bachelard
althusser
continental philosophy
author_facet Gamez Patrick
author_sort Gamez Patrick
title Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
title_short Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
title_full Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
title_fullStr Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
title_full_unstemmed Metaphysics or Metaphors for the Anthropocene? Scientific Naturalism and the Agency of Things
title_sort metaphysics or metaphors for the anthropocene? scientific naturalism and the agency of things
publisher De Gruyter
series Open Philosophy
issn 2543-8875
publishDate 2018-09-01
description In this paper, I provide the outlines of an alternative metaphilosophical orientation for Continental philosophy, namely, a form of scientific naturalism that has proximate roots in the work of Bachelard and Althusser. I describe this orientation as an “alternative” insofar as it provides a framework for doing justice to some of the motivations behind the recent revival of metaphysics in Continental philosophy, in particular its ecological-ethical motivations. In the second section of the paper, I demonstrate how ecological-ethical issues motivate new metaphysicians like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and Graham Harman to impute to objects real features of agency. I also try to show how their commitments lead to deep ambiguities in their metaphysical projects. In the final section, I outline a type of scientific naturalism in Continental philosophy that parallels the sort of naturalism championed by Quine, both conceptually and historically, and suggest that it might serve our ecological-ethical purposes better.
topic speculative realism
vital materialism
environmental ethics
non-anthropocentrism
bachelard
althusser
continental philosophy
url https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0014
work_keys_str_mv AT gamezpatrick metaphysicsormetaphorsfortheanthropocenescientificnaturalismandtheagencyofthings
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