Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation

Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symm...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Steen Vester
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2014-04-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0839v1
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spelling doaj-f90474f694414c3a9f59367d3cb0b30c2020-11-24T21:05:29ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802014-04-01146Proc. SR 2014495510.4204/EPTCS.146.7:10Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial ObservationPatricia Bouyer0Nicolas Markey1Steen Vester2 LSV – CNRS & ENS Cachan LSV – CNRS & ENS Cachan DTU, Kgs. Lyngby We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0839v1
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Patricia Bouyer
Nicolas Markey
Steen Vester
spellingShingle Patricia Bouyer
Nicolas Markey
Steen Vester
Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
author_facet Patricia Bouyer
Nicolas Markey
Steen Vester
author_sort Patricia Bouyer
title Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
title_short Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
title_full Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
title_fullStr Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
title_full_unstemmed Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
title_sort nash equilibria in symmetric games with partial observation
publisher Open Publishing Association
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
issn 2075-2180
publishDate 2014-04-01
description We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0839v1
work_keys_str_mv AT patriciabouyer nashequilibriainsymmetricgameswithpartialobservation
AT nicolasmarkey nashequilibriainsymmetricgameswithpartialobservation
AT steenvester nashequilibriainsymmetricgameswithpartialobservation
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