Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method
While network attack and defense are experiencing a rapid change, the current research achievements of network security based on traditional game theory fail to characterize the real-time performance of the actual network attack-defense process accurately. Furthermore, all kinds of disturbance and a...
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doaj-fcb9a07bb28e439f8667c6e1972768432021-03-29T20:59:17ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362018-01-016396213963410.1109/ACCESS.2018.28482428387766Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making MethodShirui Huang0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2079-283XHengwei Zhang1Jindong Wang2Jianming Huang3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4767-3021Zhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology, Zhengzhou, ChinaZhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology, Zhengzhou, ChinaZhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology, Zhengzhou, ChinaZhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology, Zhengzhou, ChinaWhile network attack and defense are experiencing a rapid change, the current research achievements of network security based on traditional game theory fail to characterize the real-time performance of the actual network attack-defense process accurately. Furthermore, all kinds of disturbance and accidental factors would affect the evolution of the network security state. Therefore, to tackle with the randomness of network security state and the high dynamic of network defense decision making, we analyzed the attack-defense behaviors from the perspectives of dynamic and real-time confrontation. Then we constructed the Markov attack-defense differential game model for the dynamic analysis to predict multi-stage continuous attack-defense process by combining differential game models and the Markov decision-making method. In addition, according to the discounted total payoffs of attack-defense game, we designed the objective function of the game. Based on previous statements, we proposed the multistage game equilibrium solution and designed the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Finally, we conducted simulations to demonstrate that the proposed model and method could shed some light to the real-time interplay of decision making between attack and defense.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8387766/Network securitynetwork attack and defensedifferential gameMarkov decision-makingoptimal strategies selection |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Shirui Huang Hengwei Zhang Jindong Wang Jianming Huang |
spellingShingle |
Shirui Huang Hengwei Zhang Jindong Wang Jianming Huang Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method IEEE Access Network security network attack and defense differential game Markov decision-making optimal strategies selection |
author_facet |
Shirui Huang Hengwei Zhang Jindong Wang Jianming Huang |
author_sort |
Shirui Huang |
title |
Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method |
title_short |
Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method |
title_full |
Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method |
title_fullStr |
Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method |
title_full_unstemmed |
Markov Differential Game for Network Defense Decision-Making Method |
title_sort |
markov differential game for network defense decision-making method |
publisher |
IEEE |
series |
IEEE Access |
issn |
2169-3536 |
publishDate |
2018-01-01 |
description |
While network attack and defense are experiencing a rapid change, the current research achievements of network security based on traditional game theory fail to characterize the real-time performance of the actual network attack-defense process accurately. Furthermore, all kinds of disturbance and accidental factors would affect the evolution of the network security state. Therefore, to tackle with the randomness of network security state and the high dynamic of network defense decision making, we analyzed the attack-defense behaviors from the perspectives of dynamic and real-time confrontation. Then we constructed the Markov attack-defense differential game model for the dynamic analysis to predict multi-stage continuous attack-defense process by combining differential game models and the Markov decision-making method. In addition, according to the discounted total payoffs of attack-defense game, we designed the objective function of the game. Based on previous statements, we proposed the multistage game equilibrium solution and designed the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Finally, we conducted simulations to demonstrate that the proposed model and method could shed some light to the real-time interplay of decision making between attack and defense. |
topic |
Network security network attack and defense differential game Markov decision-making optimal strategies selection |
url |
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8387766/ |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT shiruihuang markovdifferentialgamefornetworkdefensedecisionmakingmethod AT hengweizhang markovdifferentialgamefornetworkdefensedecisionmakingmethod AT jindongwang markovdifferentialgamefornetworkdefensedecisionmakingmethod AT jianminghuang markovdifferentialgamefornetworkdefensedecisionmakingmethod |
_version_ |
1724193791261278208 |