| Summary: | US power and prestige may have diminished in recent years, but the United States still plays a pivotal role in international institutions, alliances, and media, so who becomes president and which party controls Congress matter for the global nuclear order. Nuclear weapons are often considered the esoteric domain of experts. Yet three recent developments – the ban on above-ground nuclear tests, INF Treaty, and collapse of the Berlin Wall – would not have happened without mass protests. Popular preoccupation with COVID-19, economic distress, racial animus, and climate change makes mobilization of a mass anti-nuclear movement unlikely. The international milieu is thus critical for the nuclear future. President Trump’s reelection is likely to have a pernicious effect on that milieu, hindering international cooperation to limit nuclear weapons and accelerating a destabilizing qualitative arms race. Yet an intense crisis risking nuclear war is unlikely because he wants to avoid involvement in any wars, not start new ones. He will also try to sustain nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, though whether he would satisfy Pyongyang’s stiffer demands remains in doubt. His opponent, Joseph Biden, will face those same demands. Personnel is policy, and the Biden administration will likely be staffed with officials who served under President Obama. That means a return to shoring up alliances, international cooperation, and continuity with Obama’s nuclear policies. Whether or not he will curtail nuclear modernization, but he will try to restore the JCPOA, save New START, preserve the Open Skies accord, and seek technical talks with China.
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