A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition
The main issue addressed in this paper is to provide a reassessment of the role and relevance of the body in social cognition from a radical embodied cognitive science perspective. Initially, I provide a historical introduction of the traditional account of the body in cognitive science, which I her...
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doaj-fd4fca4085c74a52984af301d755d0172020-11-25T03:41:44ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782020-06-011110.3389/fpsyg.2020.00987484818A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social CognitionJessica LindblomThe main issue addressed in this paper is to provide a reassessment of the role and relevance of the body in social cognition from a radical embodied cognitive science perspective. Initially, I provide a historical introduction of the traditional account of the body in cognitive science, which I here call the cognitivist view. I then present several lines of criticism raised against the cognitivist view advanced by more embodied, enacted and situated approaches in cognitive science, and related disciplines. Next, I analyze several approaches under the umbrella of embodied social cognition. My line of argument is that some of these approaches, although pointing toward the right direction of conceiving that the social mind is not merely contained inside the head, still fail to fully acknowledge the radically embodied social mind. I argue that the failure of these accounts of embodied social cognition could be associated with so-called ‘simple embodiment.’ The third part of this paper focuses on elaborating an alternative characterization of the radically embodied social mind that also tries to reduce the remaining problems with ‘simple embodiment.’ I draw upon two turns in radically embodied cognitive science, the enactive turn, and the intersubjective turn. On the one hand, there is the risk of focusing too much on the individual level in social cognition that may result in new kinds of methodological individualism that partly neglect the social dimension. On the other hand, socially distributed and socially extended approaches that pay more attention to the dynamics within social interaction may encounter the risk of ignoring the individual during social interaction dynamics and simultaneously not emphasizing the role of embodiment. The approach taken is to consider several ways of describing and incorporating the (individual) social mind at the social level that includes language. I outline some ideas and motivations for how to study and expand the field of radical embodied social cognition in the future, as well as pose the ubiquitous hazard of falling back into a cognitivism view in several ways.https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00987/fullradical embodied cognitionsocial interactionembodied social cognitionmeaning-makingsense-makingsituatedness |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Jessica Lindblom |
spellingShingle |
Jessica Lindblom A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition Frontiers in Psychology radical embodied cognition social interaction embodied social cognition meaning-making sense-making situatedness |
author_facet |
Jessica Lindblom |
author_sort |
Jessica Lindblom |
title |
A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition |
title_short |
A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition |
title_full |
A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition |
title_fullStr |
A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition |
title_sort |
radical reassessment of the body in social cognition |
publisher |
Frontiers Media S.A. |
series |
Frontiers in Psychology |
issn |
1664-1078 |
publishDate |
2020-06-01 |
description |
The main issue addressed in this paper is to provide a reassessment of the role and relevance of the body in social cognition from a radical embodied cognitive science perspective. Initially, I provide a historical introduction of the traditional account of the body in cognitive science, which I here call the cognitivist view. I then present several lines of criticism raised against the cognitivist view advanced by more embodied, enacted and situated approaches in cognitive science, and related disciplines. Next, I analyze several approaches under the umbrella of embodied social cognition. My line of argument is that some of these approaches, although pointing toward the right direction of conceiving that the social mind is not merely contained inside the head, still fail to fully acknowledge the radically embodied social mind. I argue that the failure of these accounts of embodied social cognition could be associated with so-called ‘simple embodiment.’ The third part of this paper focuses on elaborating an alternative characterization of the radically embodied social mind that also tries to reduce the remaining problems with ‘simple embodiment.’ I draw upon two turns in radically embodied cognitive science, the enactive turn, and the intersubjective turn. On the one hand, there is the risk of focusing too much on the individual level in social cognition that may result in new kinds of methodological individualism that partly neglect the social dimension. On the other hand, socially distributed and socially extended approaches that pay more attention to the dynamics within social interaction may encounter the risk of ignoring the individual during social interaction dynamics and simultaneously not emphasizing the role of embodiment. The approach taken is to consider several ways of describing and incorporating the (individual) social mind at the social level that includes language. I outline some ideas and motivations for how to study and expand the field of radical embodied social cognition in the future, as well as pose the ubiquitous hazard of falling back into a cognitivism view in several ways. |
topic |
radical embodied cognition social interaction embodied social cognition meaning-making sense-making situatedness |
url |
https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00987/full |
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AT jessicalindblom aradicalreassessmentofthebodyinsocialcognition AT jessicalindblom radicalreassessmentofthebodyinsocialcognition |
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