Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

• Main Authors: Bhowmik, A (Author), Cao, J (Author)
• Format: Others
• Published: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Munich University, 2012-01-11T03:00:37Z.
• Subjects: Asymmetric information; Exactly feasible; Ex-post core; Mixed economy; NY-fine core; NY-private core; Robustly efficient allocation; NY-strong fine core; RW-fine core; Walrasian expectations allocation; Commissioned Report
• Online Access: Get fulltext

 In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].