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113916 |
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|a dc
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|a Fudenberg, Drew
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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|a Fudenberg, Drew
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|a Romanyuk, Gleb
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|a Strack, Philipp
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|a Active learning with a misspecified prior
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|b The Econometric Society,
|c 2018-03-02T21:32:13Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113916
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|a We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example with three actions shows that in a misspecified environment a myopic agent's beliefs converge while a sufficiently patient agent's beliefs do not. This illustrates a novel interaction between misspecification and the agent's subjective discount rate.
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|a National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant 1643517)
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|a Article
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|t Theoretical Economics
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