Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
We consider learning and signalling in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is subject to unobservable demand shocks. An equilibrium is Markov if play depends on the history only through the firms'...
Main Authors: | Bonatti, Alessandro (Contributor), Cisternas Leyton, Gonzalo Sebastian (Contributor), Toikka, Juuso T (Contributor) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor), Sloan School of Management (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press,
2018-03-23T22:08:25Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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