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116348 |
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|a dc
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|a Bergemann, Dirk
|e author
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|a Sloan School of Management
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|a Bonatti, Alessandro
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|a Bonatti, Alessandro
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|a Smolin, Alex
|e author
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|a The Design and Price of Information
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|b American Economic Association,
|c 2018-06-15T18:28:16Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116348
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|a A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments.
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|a Article
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|t American Economic Review
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