The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
The communication revelation principle (RP) of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication RP fails for the solution...
Main Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo (Author), Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg (Author) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press (OUP),
2022-02-25T22:17:22Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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