Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions about the bidder behavior, such as it being myopic, infinite lookahead, or some specific form of learning behavior. Is i...
Main Authors: | Agrawal, Shipra (Author), Daskalakis, Constantinos (Author), Mirrokni, Vahab S. (Author), Sivan, Balasubramanian (Author) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM),
2021-11-05T14:51:45Z.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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