Color realism revisited

Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hilbert, David R. (Author), Byrne, Alex (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press, 2010-01-22T18:52:14Z.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
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520 |a Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part, R4, takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. 
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