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51041 |
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|a Gillies, Anthony S.
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
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|a von Fintel, Kai
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|a von Fintel, Kai
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|a von Fintel, Kai
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|a CIA Leaks
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|b Duke University Press,
|c 2010-01-29T19:03:30Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/51041
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|a Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and-the new wrinkle-points of assessment (hence, CIA). Here we argue against such "relativist" semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue central problems that any such theory faces. We end by outlining an alternative story.
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|a Article
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|t Philosophical Review
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