Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show...
Main Authors: | Kojima, Fuhito (Author), Pathak, Parag (Contributor) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
American Economic Association,
2011-03-11T14:36:14Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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