Monotonicity and Implementability

• Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai (Contributor), Braverman, Mark (Author), Hassidim, Avinatan (Contributor), Monderer, Dov (Author)
• Other Authors: Sloan School of Management (Contributor)
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Econometric Society, 2011-05-25T20:08:20Z.
• Subjects: Article
• Online Access: Get fulltext

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
Israeli Science Foundation
Technion, Israel Institute of Technology