Bargaining in Stationary Networks
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement li...
Main Author: | Manea, Mihai (Contributor) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
American Economic Association,
2012-09-17T19:14:52Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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