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|a Pathak, Parag
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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|a Pathak, Parag
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|a The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment
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|b Annual Reviews,
|c 2012-09-26T19:55:40Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73198
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|a The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a road map for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, it concludes with some open questions.
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|a National Science Foundation (U.S.)
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t Annual Review of Economics
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