Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and Other Generalizations
It was recently shown in [12] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent additive bidders with arbitrary (possibly comb...
Main Authors: | Cai, Yang (Contributor), Daskalakis, Konstantinos (Contributor), Weinberg, Seth Matthew (Contributor) |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM),
2015-11-20T17:11:02Z.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
Similar Items
-
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2015) -
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
by: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, et al.
Published: (2020) -
Revenue maximization and ex-post budget constraints
by: Daskalakis, C., et al.
Published: (2018) -
Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms
by: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, et al.
Published: (2015) -
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2015)