前瞻性績效衡量值運用於全權委託投資業務之經濟分析

• Main Authors: 陳燕錫, Chen,Yahn-Shir
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 全權委託投資業務; 代客操作; 主理人-代理人模式; 前瞻性績效衡量值; 改良式績效佣金制度; Discretion account business; Principle-agent model; Forward-looking performance measure; Improved performance fee system
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22B2002001135%22.

全權委託投資業務(俗稱代客操作),在證券市場中提供專業投資管理服務。我國證期會於民國81年，政策性地決定將開放此項業務。雖然整個規範體系已在民國87年建立，但它忽略掉經濟層面之考量，勢必造成全權委託投資契約無效率。 目前規範體系所允許之委託報酬的計算方法，稱之為「固定佣金制度」，由於此制度無法對業者提供經濟誘因，它會引發業者有嚴重之道德危險發生。因此，為解決誘因問題，應該使用「績效佣金制度」，不過在目前股市環境下，此一制度則引入過高之風險。因此，為解決兩種制度所帶來之問題，本文提出「改良式績效佣金制度」，在此制度下，委託報酬除基於傳統財務績效衡量值外，並基於非財務性績效衡量值，本文稱之為前瞻性績效衡量值（簡稱F-LPM）。 本文使用兩期之「主理人-代理人」模型，推導出最適委託報酬制度以及相關之比較靜態。在基本模式之下，本文進一步探討F-LPM之相關屬性及功能。所得結果與相關文獻一致，首先是，在最適委託報酬制度下，納入F-LPM可降低業者過度地重視短期，因而犧牲了委任人之報酬，這表示F-LPM具有增額資訊內涵。其次，無成本地提高F-LPM之精確度，可增加委任人之報酬。最後，改良式績效佣金制度優於固定佣金制度與績效佣金制度，因為它可降低風險，因而帶給委任人之報酬增加。 第壹章 緒論 第一節 === Discretion account business provides professional investment management service in the securities market. The Securities and Futures Commission decides in policy to approve the business in 1992. Althrough the regulation system of the discretion account business has been established, it will make the advisory contract inefficient with the negligence of economic consideration. The form of advisory fees permitted by the regulation system is 'constant fee system'. Under the system, advisory contract provides no incentive and serious moral harazd will occur. In order to solve the motivation problem, 'performance fee system' should be used. Under the circumstance of Taipei securities market, however, the performance fee system will bring in high risk. Hence, this paper suggests the 'improved performance fee system' to overcome the dilemma born by the performance fee system. In the improved system, advisory fees are based on the traditional performance measure and the fordward-looking performance measure (hereafter F-LPM). With a two-period principal-agent model, this paper develops the optimal reward system and related comparative static. Following the basic model, the paper examines the attributes and function of F-LPM. The findings are consistent with the related literature. First, the inclusion of a F-LPM in reward system can mitigate the potential for the advisor to focus excessively on the short-term at the expense of the investor. That is, F-LPM is incremental informative. Second, costless increases in precision of F-LPM will lead to increase in payoffs for the inveator. Finally, the improved performance fee system is superior to the constant fee system and the performance fee system in that it can reduce risk and results in higher payoffs to the investor.