| Summary: | 1980年起許多開發中國家紛紛進行外匯體制的改革，將原先所實行的複式匯率制或固定匯率制改為浮動匯率制，中國則在1994年進行外匯體制改革，取消原有官方牌價匯率與調劑匯率並存的「雙匯率制」，改制為市場為基礎的管理浮動匯率制度，而建立了統一規範的外匯市場。
改革後，官方牌價匯率向原先調劑匯率的水準靠攏，一舉從一美元兌換5.8元人民幣調整為一美元兌換8.7元人民幣，一天內人民幣貶值幅度高達33%，而統一後的匯率則十分的平穩。而根據本論文研究結果，此平穩的現象並非如一般學者所指「在改革前調劑匯率已經取代官方牌價匯率，成為外匯主要的結算工具」，而是早在政府宣布改制之前，由於消息面出現匯率將進行改革等訊息，在人民看貶人民幣的預期心理下，調劑市場的匯率已經出現過巨幅的波動。因而等到政府真正宣布進行匯率制度變革時，由於匯率已經事先反應，所以統一後的匯率並未出現巨幅的波動。
另外根據實證研究結果顯示，在長期受政府控制的官方牌價匯率隨著貨幣供給的增加而上升，而在短期由於累積匯外為政府的政策目標，因此當外匯存底變動時，政府會調整官方牌價匯率及干預「可部份自由交易」的調劑匯率，同時以兩匯率的交易量為調整係數及干預係數。另外在短期，政府隨著調匯率的上升而調升官方牌價匯率，來縮小兩匯率的價差，不過官方牌價匯的調整速度遠小於調齊匯率上升的速度。
總之，在短期政府可以將匯率變成平衡國際收支、累積外匯或穩定物價的政策工具，而採取「雙匯率」，並對不同的匯率進行管制、調整或干預，但是在長期只要政府不斷的增加貨幣供給，政府將被迫進行匯率制度的變革，且必須放棄其所控制的官方牌價匯率，而向具有「部份可自由交易」的調劑匯率靠攏。 === In the 1980s, many developing countries starting foreign exchange regime reforms. They changed their orginal foreign exchange regimes such as a dual exchange rate system or a fixed exchange rate system to an unified floating exchange regime. In 1994, following this world trend, China(Peoples’s Republic of China)started a new foreign exchange regime reform. The China government abolished its original dual foreign exchange rate system which the official exchange rate had been co-existing with local adjustment exchange rate to a new market mechanism-orientated, unified, and managed floating exchange rate system.
Meanwhile, in this foreign exchange regime reform, China raised its official exchange rate from 5.8(Rembin / per US$)to 8.7 which had been the average level of the local adjustment exchange rate in national wide local foreign exchange adjustment centers(or swap centers). Within one day(1994.1.1), the value of China’s Rembin was depreciated as dramatically as 33%. However, after the reform, the newly unified official exchange rate did not fluctuate intensely and showed very stable. According to my research, the reason for this stable phenomena of the newly unified official exchange rate was not what most of the scholars regarded, such as “before this new foreign exchange regime reform, the local adjustment exchange rate had replaced the money exchange function of original offcal exchange rate and had become the major money exchange instrument in China”. But, in 1993, before the China government announced this new foreign exchange regime reform, the local adjustment exchange rate had already fluctuated intensely under the public’s perceptions of the information of future on-going foreign exchange regime reform in China and the public’s expectations of the further depreciation of Rembin value. This was why at the time when the China government really announced to start the new foreign exchange regime reform, the newly unified official exchange rate could still maintain very stable and did not fluctuate intensely, for the real level of the China exchange rate already reacted on local adjustment exchange rate and the public’s expectations of the depreciation of Rembin value had already disappeared.
The results of the empirical research in the thesis also showed that the government controlled official exchange rate would rise up along with the increasing of money supply in the long-run. But, in the short run, when the level of foreign reserve had changed, for the accumulation of foreign reserve was the goal of governmental economic policy, the China government would both adjust its controlled official exchange rate and intervene in semi-free exchangeable local adjustment exchange rate by different adjusting and intervening parameters which had been set by referring to the amounts of mony exchanged through the two exchange rate. Meanwhile, also in the short run, when the local adjustment exchange rate had rised, the China government would also adjust up the official exchange rate to reduce the gap between the two exchange rate. However, the speed and the scale of official exchange rate adjusted by government were far behind the changes of semi-free exchangeable local adjustment exchange rate.
The conclusions of my thesis is that in the short-run, the exchange rates can be governmental policy instruments to serve different policy goal such as to balance its national balance of payment, to serve different policy goal such as to balance its national balance of payments, to accumulate foreign reserve and to stabilize inflation by adopting the dual foreign exchange rate system and by controlling or intervening in different exchange rates. But, in the long-run, if the money supply has been increased all the time, the government will be forced to abolish its original foreign exchange rate system like the dual exchange rate system and give up its controlled official exchange rate level to unify with the semi-free exchangeable local adjustment exchange rate level.
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