Teams contribute more and punish less
Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use...
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Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden
2016
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ndltd-DRESDEN-oai-qucosa.de-bsz-14-qucosa-2100342016-09-30T03:30:22Z Teams contribute more and punish less Auerswald, Heike Schmidt, Carsten Thum, Marcel Torsvik, Gaute Öffentliche Güter Entscheidungsverhalten in Gruppen Bestrafung Experiment Public Good Group Decision-Making Punishment Experiment ddc:330 rvk:QC 000 Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals. Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics 2016-09-29 doc-type:workingPaper application/pdf http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-210034 urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-210034 issn:2510-1196 http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/21003/CEPIE_WP_02_2016.pdf eng dcterms:isPartOf:CEPIE Working Paper ; 02/16 |
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Öffentliche Güter Entscheidungsverhalten in Gruppen Bestrafung Experiment Public Good Group Decision-Making Punishment Experiment ddc:330 rvk:QC 000 |
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Öffentliche Güter Entscheidungsverhalten in Gruppen Bestrafung Experiment Public Good Group Decision-Making Punishment Experiment ddc:330 rvk:QC 000 Auerswald, Heike Schmidt, Carsten Thum, Marcel Torsvik, Gaute Teams contribute more and punish less |
description |
Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals. |
author2 |
Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics |
author_facet |
Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics Auerswald, Heike Schmidt, Carsten Thum, Marcel Torsvik, Gaute |
author |
Auerswald, Heike Schmidt, Carsten Thum, Marcel Torsvik, Gaute |
author_sort |
Auerswald, Heike |
title |
Teams contribute more and punish less |
title_short |
Teams contribute more and punish less |
title_full |
Teams contribute more and punish less |
title_fullStr |
Teams contribute more and punish less |
title_full_unstemmed |
Teams contribute more and punish less |
title_sort |
teams contribute more and punish less |
publisher |
Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-210034 http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-210034 http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/21003/CEPIE_WP_02_2016.pdf |
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AT auerswaldheike teamscontributemoreandpunishless AT schmidtcarsten teamscontributemoreandpunishless AT thummarcel teamscontributemoreandpunishless AT torsvikgaute teamscontributemoreandpunishless |
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1718385760168574976 |